Roger Stone’s commentary on the 25th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks focuses on how the hijackers obtained entry to the U.S., highlighting Saudi visa practices and former CIA official John Brennan’s work in the kingdom.
In a StoneZone article, Stone argues that weak screening created an opening exploited by al-Qaeda operatives.
Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals, according to the 9/11 Commission’s staff report on terrorist travel. Fourteen obtained visas through U.S. diplomatic posts in Saudi Arabia, while one received a visa elsewhere.
Eleven hijackers received visas from a single consular officer in Jeddah. The commission found that several applications were incomplete and many applicants were not interviewed.
The report documented problems in the applications. Some men listed questionable addresses, misspelled locations or provided information that should have prompted additional scrutiny.
The commission examined Visa Express, introduced across Saudi Arabia in June 2001. Applicants could submit paperwork through designated travel agencies, with interviews conducted only when consular officials requested them.
Four hijackers received visas in Jeddah during the program’s operation. The commission said Visa Express was created largely to reduce crowds and improve security at diplomatic facilities.
The commission did not conclude that the program increased approval rates for Saudi applicants. It found that the system reduced direct contact between applicants and consular officers and ended a more aggressive interview policy in Jeddah.
Stone links the visa system to Brennan, who served as CIA station chief in Riyadh from 1996 to 1999. Official biographies place Brennan in that role before he later became CIA director.
Stone also repeats claims from former consular officer J. Michael Springmann, who alleged that CIA personnel influenced visa decisions in Jeddah during his 1987-89 assignment. Springmann’s account predates the hijackers’ applications by more than a decade.
The 9/11 Commission did not establish that the CIA used the consulate to move future hijackers into the U.S. Nor did it establish that Saudi officials, as a government, directed the attacks.
The commission concluded that the hijackers entered through failures involving visa processing, immigration inspections, intelligence sharing and information management.
The commission report said the hijackers passed through U.S. ports of entry 33 times and were refused entry once. Several used fraudulent documents or violated immigration rules.
The visa records remain part of broader questions about Saudi connections to the plot. Former CIA Director Brennan has said there is no evidence that the Saudi government, as an institution, directed the attacks.
The commission found that intelligence agencies received repeated warnings about bin Laden’s plans but lacked details needed to identify the full operation.
The attacks killed nearly 3,000 people after al-Qaeda hijackers seized four passenger planes. Two struck New York’s World Trade Center, one hit the Pentagon and another crashed in Pennsylvania.
Stone’s article argues that commemorations should also examine the administrative decisions that allowed the attackers to obtain visas and pass through screening systems before Sept. 11, 2001.
The evidence points to institutional failures and unresolved questions about public accountability and transparency.
